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Ascription of Criminal States of Mind:
Toward a Defense Theory for the Coercively
Persuaded ("Brainwashed") Defendant
Richard Delgado*
I. INTRODUCTION
Coercive persuasion, or thought reform,' has been extensively
described by psychologists and psychiatrists in field studies of prison-
ers of war,' victims of Chinese "revolutionary universities,"'3 captives
of outlaw or extremist groups,' and members of religious cults.5 In
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington. I am indebted to the
following individuals, whose help made this article possible: Robert Lifton, M.D.,
Foundations Professor of Psychiatry, Yale Medical School, who nourished my under-
standing of the psychology of totalism; Michael Shapiro, Professor of Law, University
of Southern California Law Center, for suggestions and helpful criticism of my ideas;
and Richard Cleva, James Brewer, Cokey Woodard, Patrick Marshall, Karen Perret,
and Richard Goldsmith, for research and editorial assistance. I also gratefully acknowl-
edge grants from the University of Washington Graduate School and Faculty Develop-
ment Fund, 1977-78.
1. "Coercive persuasion" and "thought reform" are terms for a forcible indoctri-
nation process designed to induce the subject to abandon existing political, religious,
or social beliefs in favor of a rigid system imposed by the indoctrinator. This process
is popularly referred to as "brainwashing," although scientists generally avoid use of
this latter term because of a widespread public emotional response and misuse of the
term, see, e,g., R. LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ToTALISM: A STUDY
OF "BRAINwASHU4G" IN CHNA 4-5 (1961), and because by glib repetition in many con-
texts it has lost all semblance of its original narrow meaning, see, e.g., Gunther,
Brainwashing: Persuasion by Propaganda, TODAY'S HEALTH, Feb. 1976, at 15.
2. See, e.g., J. SEGAL, THERAPEUTIC CONSIDERATIONS IN PLANNING THE RETURN OF
AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR TO CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (U.S. Navy, Neuro-
Psychiatric Research Unit, Rep. No. 72-37, 1973); Lifton, Home by Ship: Reaction
Patterns of American Prisoners of War Repatriated from North Korea, 110 AM. J.
PSYCH. 732 (1954); Schein, The Chinese Indoctrination Program for Prisoners 'of War,
19 PSYCH. 149 (1956); Strassman, Thaler & Schein, A Prisoner of War Syndrome:
Apathy as a Reaction to Severe Stress, 112 Am. J. PSYCH. 998 (1956). See generally J.
MEERLO, RAPE OF THE MIND (1956).
3. See, e.g., R. LIFrON, supra note 1, at 247-48, 253-73; E. SCHEIN, COERCIVE
PERSUASION (1961).
4. See, e.g., V. BuGmosi & C. GENTRY, HELTER SKELTER (1974) (trial of Manson
cultists); THE TRIAL OF PATrY HEARST (1976) [hereinafter cited as HEARST] (trial
transcript of United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 873 (N.D. Cal. 1976)) (Numerous
motions ruled on in this trial are reported at 412 F. Supp. 858-95.).
5. See Delgado,'Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the
First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 10-25 (1977), and sources cited therein (psy-
chologists and psychiatrists describe psychological servitude resulting from indoctrina-
tion and membership in extremist religious cults). See also W. SARGANT, BATTLE FOR
H MiD 91-158 (1957) (describing techniques of religious conversion).
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more controlled settings, behavioral scientists have explored the con-
tributions that isolation,' physiological depletion,' assertions of
authority,' guilt manipulation,' peer pressure,10 and cognitive disso-
nance" can have in bringing about behavioral compliance and attitu-
dinal change. Despite some disagreement over the theoretical model
that best explains such changes,'" it is generally agreed that certain
elements or themes are centrally involved in instances of coercive
persuasion. These include:
(1) isolation of the victim and total control over his environ-
ment;
(2) control of all channels of information and communication;
(3) physiological debilitation by means of inadequate diet, in-
sufficient sleep, and poor sanitation;
(4) assignment of meaningless tasks, such as repetitious copy-
ing of written material;
6. See, e.g., GROUP FOR THE ADvANcxmENr oF PSYCHIATRY, Symposium No. 3: FAc-
TORS USED TO INCREASE THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS To FORCEFUL INDOCTRINATION
90-93 (1956) [hereinafter cited as G.A.P. Symposium No. 3]; GROUP FOR THE ADVANCE-
MENT OF PSYCHIATRY, SymposIuM No. 2: ILLusTRATrYE STRATEGIES FOR RESEARCH ON PSy-
CHOPATHOLOGY IN MENTAL HEALTH 14, 18-20, 98-103 (1956) [hereinafter cited as G.A.P.
SymposiuM No. 2]; Lilly, Mental Effects of Reduction of Ordinary Levels of Physical
Stimuli on Intact, Healthy Persons, 5 PSYCH. RESEARCH REP. 1 (1956).
7. See, e.g., G.A.P. SympOSIUM No. 2, supra note 6, at 103, 122, 123; Rensberger,
A Brainwashing Defense: Delving Into Murky Area, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1976, at 1,
col. 4 (reporting that many such studies were unpublished investigations carried out
by the Department of Defense using conscientious objectors as subjects). Physio-
logical depletion-the deliberate inducement of physical debility by means of starva-
tion, terror, and inadequate sleep and sanitation-has been described as a potent
weapon of thought reform, see, e.g., Chodoff, Effects of Extreme, Coercive & Oppres-
sive Forces, in 3 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 384 (S. Arieti ed. 1966); Farber,
Harlow & West, Brainwashing, Conditioning, aznd DDD (Debility, Dependency, and
Dread), 20 SociOMSrRY 271 (1957).
8. See Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority,
18 HUMAN REL. 57 (1965); Milgram, Group Pressure and Action Against a Person, 69
J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 137 (1964); Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNOR-
MAL PSYCH. 371 (1963).
9. See E. ScHIN, supra note 3, at 140-56, and sources cited therein.
10. See, e.g., Asch, Studies of Independence and Submission to Group Pressure:
A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS, No.
416 (1956).
11. See, e.g., E. ARONSON, THE SOCI.L ANIMAL 122-25 (1972); L. FESTINGER, A
THEORY OF COGNrrivE DISSONANCE 84-97 (1957). Dissonance theory describes the tend-
ency of human beings to alter belief systems to accord with changed behavioral pat-
terns.
12. For an excellent discussion of the various theories or models that have been
proposed to explain the phenomenon of coercive persuasion, see E. SCHEIN, supra note
3, at 195-268. Dr. Schein analyzes psycho-physiological stress theories, traditional
learning theory models, psychoanalytical theories, socio-psychological theories, cogni-
tive theory, and social-influence and attitude change theories. After reviewing each of
them, he adopts an eclectic approach, combining a number of models with observed
mechanisms that are employed at various stages to facilitate change. Id. at 254.
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(5) manipulation of guilt and anxiety;
(6) threats of annihilation by seemingly all-powerful captors,
who insist that the victim's sole chance for survival lies in
identifying with them;
(7) degradation of and assaults on the pre-existing self;
(8) peer pressure, often applied through ritual "struggle ses-
sions";
(9) required performance of symbolic acts of self-betrayal, be-
trayal of group norms, and confession;
(10) alternation of harshness and leniency. 3
Acting alone, none of these forces is likely to prove irresistible to
a person of ordinary resolve, particularly if he is aware that an at-
tempt is under way to influence him." Rather, it is the concentration
of multiple forces, both physical and psychological, intensively ap-
plied over a short period of time, that gives coercive persuasion its
peculiar power. 5 Many authorities, including the drafters of a De-
partment of Defense report prepared in response to evidence of wide-
spread collaboration by American prisoners of war (POW) during the
Korean conflict, have concluded that a determined captor, posses-
sing total control over the life and environment of a captive, can
produce behavioral and attitudinal change in even the most strongly
resistant individual."
13. See generally G.A.P. SYMPOsIUM No. 3, supra note 5; HEARST, supra note 4,
at 317 (testimony of Robert J. Lifton); R. LIrroN, supra note 1 (classic study of survi-
vors of Chinese thought reform); J. MEERLO, supra note 2; W. SARGANT, supra note 5;
E. SCHEIN, supra note 3 (eclectic view of coercive persuasion). See also Bettelheim,
Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations, 38 J. A R oikA & Soc. PsycH.
417 (1943); Farber, Harlow & West, supra note 7; Lifton, supra note 2; Strassman,
Thaler & Schein, supra note 2; J. Segal, Long-Term Psychological and Physical Effects
of the POW Experience: A Review of the Literature (1973) (unpublished paper) (filed
with Center for Prisoner of War Studies, Navy Medical Neuropsychiatric Research
Unit, San Diego, California).
14. For this reason, many of the experiments referred to in notes 6 & 8-40 supra
were designed as "deception experiments"-those in which the subject is deliberately
deceived about the objectives of the study.
15. See, e.g., HEARST, supra note 4, at 250 (testimony of Louis J. West); id. at
327-28 (cross-examination of Robert J. Lifton); R. LiFrON, supra note 1, at 8-15, 66-
85. See generally G.A.P. SyMPOSIUM No. 3, supra note 6.
16. See SECRErARY OF DEFENSE'S ADVISORY Comm. ON POWs, POW, THE FIGHT
CONTINUES AFTER THE BATTLE (1955); Farber, Harlow & West, supra note 7, at 278("possibility of resistance [becomes] vanishingly small"); Meerlo, The Pisychology
of Treason and Loyalty, 8 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 648, 655 (1954); Schein, Reaction
Patterns to Severe Chronic Stress in American Army Prisoners of War of the Chinese,
13 J. Soc. IssuEs, No. 3, at 21-40 (1957). See also W. SARGANT, supra note 5, at 55,
108-09 (resistance simply hastens victim's ultimate collapse).
These conclusions, largely based on field studies and interviews, are further sup-
ported by the results of what appears to be the sole consciously designed experiment
testing the ability of multiple coercive forces to elicit desired behavior changes. During
the Vietnam War, the United States Air Force and Navy developed a survival training
program for senior military officers, particularly pilots, who were exposed to the high-
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Apart from Korean POW cases,"7 allegations of the use of
thought reform techniques have arisen in two areas of recent contro-
versy. The first concerns a number of new-age religious cults that,
according to their critics, utilize high-pressure thought reform meth-
ods to induce college-age youths to join them as devotees, fund rais-
ers, and street-comer proselytizers."8 The second involves individuals
such as Patricia Hearst who are tried for criminal acts asserted to
have been induced by coercive persuasion."
Both of these situations involve the use of similar methods and
est degree of risk of capture and interrogation by the North Vietnamese. The aim was
to strengthen their resistance to coercive persuasion techniques in order to safeguard
tactical military secrets for the longest possible time. After being dropped off in a
desert without food or maps, the officers practiced survival skills and then were
"captured" by "pseudo-enemies," dressed in strange uniforms and communicating in
an unfamiliar language. After a night of enforced sleeplessness, the officers were indi-
vidually interrogated, put into isolation in small cells and reinterrogated by their
captors in an effort to elicit hypothetical military "secrets" the officers had been given
before the commencement of their training. Despite introductory lectures forewarning
them of the experiences they would undergo and reassuring them that neither they nor
their families would be in any real physical danger, "a very remarkably high percen-
tage, as high as twenty-five percent of these experienced. . . senior officers" confessed
and divulged the "secrets" they had been told to conceal. Some even revealed genuine
military secrets. HEARST, supra note 4, at 292-93 (testimony of Martin T. Orne).
Eventually the program was redesigned to make it "less realistic" because partici-
pants were experiencing psychiatric symptoms and developing fear of, instead of re-
sistance to, the techniques employed. See id. at 252 (testimony of Louis J. West).
This study contributed to a decision by the Department of Defense not to court-
martial returning POW collaborators after the Vietnamese conflict, except for those
who had participated in the most egregious acts of complicity. In fact no such prose-
cutions were'recorded. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Mar. 19, 1976, at 40, col. 1
(interview with Martin T. Orne).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Olson, 20 C.M.R. 46 (A.C.M.R. 1955), affl'd, 7
C.M.A. 460, 22 C.M.R. 250 (1957); United States v. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452 (1954),
aff'd, 7 C.M.A. 354, 22 C.M.R. 144 (1956); United States v. Fleming, 19 C.M.R. 438
(1954), aff'd, 7 C.M.A. 543, 23 C.M.R. 7 (1957). See also G.A.P. SymposiuM No. 3,
supra note 6; N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1954, at 16, col. 3 (case of Colonel Schwable;
prosecution not brought because of finding of intense pressures applied during cap-
tivity).
18. &e, e.g., (0-OiiAkSENATE SmE= COMM. ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, HEARING
ON THE IMPACT OF CULTS ON ToDAY'S YOUTH (1974) [hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA
HEARING]; NEw YoRK A~rORNEy GENERAL, FINAL REPORT ON THE AcrivrEs oF THE
CHILDREN OF GOD (1974); Vermont Legislative Council, Hearing Before the Vermont
Senate Comm. for the Investigation of Alleged Deceptive, Fraudulent and Criminal
Practices of Various Organizations in the State (Aug. 18, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Vermont Hearing]. See generally Delgado, supra note 4, at 5-6, and authorities cited
therein.
19. See United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 873 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (trial tran-
script reprinted in HEARST, supra note 4); cf. Borowitz, Psychological Kidnapping in
Italy: The Case of Aldo Braibanti, 57 A.B.A.J. 990 (1971) (conviction for attempted
plagio-the reduction of another to a state of psychological subjection). See also People
v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976), cert. denied sub noam.
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the goal of controlling the minds of others for given purposes."0 Be-
cause the legal contexts in which these cases arise are distinct, how-
ever, each area of controversy involves unique issues. For example,
the primary question in connection with the use of such methods by
religious cults is the extent to which their peculiar conversion prac-
tices merit the protection of the first amendment.2 ' In prosecutions
of criminal defendants, by contrast, the fundamental issue is the
extent to which coercive treatment interferes with the victim's capac-
ity to formulate voluntarily the criminal intent required to uphold a
criminal charge.2 These two areas of controversy can overlap: a reli-
gious convert might be induced by his leaders to commit acts-such
as soliciting donations for nonexisting social programs-that violate
the criminal law.? At trial he might attempt to interpose his forcible
conversion as a defense.
An earlier article by this author considered issues raised by reli-
Manson v. California, 430 U.S. 986 (1977) (penalty trial) (reported in V. BUoI= &
C. GENTRY, supra note 4).
20. There are other parallels as well. The voluntariness of the cult-joining pro-
cess, which plays an important part in the first amendment analysis, Delgado, supra
note 5, at 49-62, corresponds roughly to the analysis of intent in the case of criminal
defendants. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CnaINAL LAw § 25,
at 180 & n.23 (1972) ("[lIt is clear that criminal liability requires that the activity in
question be voluntary."). The latitude afforded religious choice, see, e.g., U.S. CONST.
amend. I; Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 n.28 (1977); West Virginia
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("[N]o official ... can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in ... religion .... "), parallels the presumption of the
criminal law that individuals, for the most part, act freely and voluntarily, W. LAFAvE
& A. Scorr, supra § 28, at 202-03 ("[P]eople are 'presumed to intend the natural and
probable consequences of [their] acts'" and are liable for "whatever a reasonable man
would have foreseen as probable.").
21. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 5, at 9-49.
22. There are, of course, other differences as well. The purposes for which claims
of coercive persuasion are argued can be diametrically opposed. In the religious cult
controversy, allegations of thought reform are urged as a justification for state inter-
vention, see Delgado, supra note 5, at 88-91, whereas in the case of criminal defen-
dants, they are used to resist the state's power to punish, see, e.g., Lunde & Wilson,
Brainwashing as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Patty Hearst Revisited, 13 Cans. L.
BuLL. 341, 377-82 (1977); Note, Brainwashing: Fact, Fiction and Criminial Defense, 44
U. Mo. KAN. Crry L. REv. 438, 478-79 (1976). Both commentaries propose that coercive
persuasion, although not constituting a cognizable defense, still presents grounds for
mitigation of sentences.
23. Lunde & Wilson, supra note 22, at 352, also suggests the hypothetical exam-
ple of a new convert assisting in the kidnapping of another for the purpose of initiating
that person into the recent convert's newfound religious faith. The opposite problem
can be presented when criminal defendants (such as Charles Colson, a Watergate
defendant) allege that a conversion has taken place, with the result that they are no
longer suitable objects of punishment. Cf. Delgado, Organically Induced Behavioral
Change in Correctional Institutions: Release Decisions and the "New Man"
Phenomenon, 50 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 215 (1977) (impact of organically induced personality
change on the notion of criminal culpability).
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giously motivated thought reform;" the present Article addresses the
question of how the legal system should treat the coercively per-
suaded criminal defendant. Although not dictated by the number of
victims of wartime or religious coercive persuasion," the present in-
quiry is of interest for several reasons. The frequency with which such
cases arise is likely to accelerate as social conditions conducive to
terrorism and other forms of psychologically totalistic behavior con-
tinue,26 and as the potential utility of thought reform methods be-
comes more widely known among extremist groups.Y Moreover, com-
mentators who have considered the problem of the coercively per-
suaded defendant have concluded, largely on an analysis of the Patri-
cia Hearst case, that no legal defense is available to such an individ-
ual.2s If they are correct,2' their conclusion is a troubling one, for it
24. Delgado, supra note 5.
25. Although the number of young persons involved in the country's 200 to 1,000
religious cults is relatively large-perhaps on the order of one to three million youths,
see Delgado, supra note 5, at 6-7 nn.24-26-very few persons have attempted to raise
a criminal defense of brainwashing. These are restricted to the POW cases, see note
17 supra, the case of Patricia Hearst, see note 19 supra, the case of Charles Manson,
see note 19 supra, and the recent "brainwashing by television" case, Zamora v. State,
361 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1978), discussed in Ayres, Influence of TV Fails as Defense Plea,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1977, § A, at 18, col. 1; Ayres, Despite Conviction of Youth, Debate
Over TV Violence Continues, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1977, at 10, col. 1; Did TV Make
Him Do It, TmE, Oct. 10, 1977, at 87; TVon Trial, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 1977, at 104.
26. Interview with Robert J. Lifton, M.D., Foundations Professor of Psychiatry,
Yale Medical School, in New York City (May 15, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Lifton
Interview]. Professor Lifton is the author of several seminal works on the psychology
of totalism, including R. LnITON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTAUSM:
A STUDY OF "BRANwAsmNG" IN CHINA (1961) (cited in note 1 supra); Lifton, Thought
Reform of Chinese Intellectuals: A Psychiatric Evaluation, 13 J. Soc. IsSUES 5 (1957);
Lifton, Home by Ship: Reaction Patterns of American Prisoners of War Repatriated
from North Korea, 110 Am. J. PSYCH. 732 (1954) (cited in note 2 supra).
27. See Miller, Conference Summary, in G.A.P. SYMposIuM No. 3, supra note 6,
at 295.
28. Lunde & Wilson, supra note 22, at 363-76; Note, supra note 22, at 460-79.
29. Lunde and Wilson's conclusion may be incorrect. There may well be enough
elasticity in such defenses as insanity and diminished capacity to permit their exten-
sion to at least some coercively persuaded defendants. For example, insanity might be
found in cases involving a severe traumatic neurosis which affected the victim's ability
to appreciate the nature of the allegedly criminal act or to know that it was wrong.
Some progressive tests for insanity require only that the "abnormal condition of the
mind .. .substantially affect .. .mental or emotional processes and impair . ..
behavioral controls." McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
cited with approval in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Since thought reform may cause exactly such results, a victim might successfully argue
that he was rendered legally.insane by the process of thought reform.
Diminished capacity is a second possible defense. Where recognized, the defense
will lie if the accused lacked the ability to form the specific type of intent required for
conviction, for example, premeditation in the case of first degree murder. See generally
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means denying a defense to a class of defendants who are, by ordinary
moral intuitions, 0 often more victims than perpetrators.3'
W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 20, § 42, at 325-26. In cases of coercive persuasion,
the victim may argue that his capacity has been so affected that he was unable to form
the specific intent required for the crime, or unable to "maturely and meaningfully"
reflect upon the gravity of his contemplated act. People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 821,
394 P.2d 959, 975, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 287 (1964) (emphasis omitted).
The defense of duress may also be available. This defense requires that the defen-
dant believe that should he fail to act as demanded he, or another, will be severely
injured or killed. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 20, § 49. The threat
must be one that a person of reasonable firmness would find impossible to resist.
Because the victim of thought reform often continues to feel controlled by the captors
even after leaving their presence, he may "reasonably," if incorrectly, believe that he
will suffer punishment if he fails to act as expected. Alternatively, forced subjection
to the process may of itself supply sufficient coercion to justify application of the
defense. Since the defense excuses one who "chooses" to perform a criminal act when
forced to do so, it would constitute no great extension of the doctrine to excuse those
who have been forced to "choose" to commit a crime consistent with their new, coer-
cively induced beliefs and values.
Even though existing defenses might be capable of extension, at least in some
cases, to encompass victims of coercive persuasion, it does not follow that this would
be the most desirable solution. Extension of existing doctrine to include the "hard
case" of a coercively persuaded defendant may blur the lines separating legal concepts
to the point where no one can predict their boundaries. Moreover, this solution may
be available only to some thought reform victims-those who are able to bring their
mistreatment within the parameters of some existing defense theory. Others will be
left without any defense. Finally, a totally new defense has the considerable advan-
tages of analytical simplicity and precision, predictability, as well as other benefits
discussed at p. 33 infra.
30. The decision to recognize a given defense, like the decision to criminalize
certain forms of behavior, is ultimately a moral one, reflecting notions of acceptable
conduct under current social standards. This Article has previously offered support for
the proposition that it is morally desirable to afford some degree of exculpation for
coercively persuaded defendants. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text. Later
sections examine whether such a defense is consistent with existing legal doctrine and
can withstand objections that have been or could be made against it. Ultimately,
however, the moral premise that persons who have without fault undergone brutalizing
experiences aimed at effecting drastic changes in their thoughts and behavior should
not be held accountable for actions stemming from these experiences-like moral
premises generally-cannot be proved, at least not in the same way in which facts in
the physical world may be. One who has rejected the underlying moral premise of this
Article will, of course, be unpersuaded by later sections of the analysis, for they deal
only with analytical continuities and other more formal aspects of the defense.
31. The public's attitude toward Patricia Hearst is illustrative. According to the
Field poll, early in 1975 about ninety percent of the general public believed that
Patricia Hearst was guilty and should be sentenced to prison. One year later, as more
of the circumstances of her treatment by the S.L.A. became known, a "large majority"
favored imprisonment. In a recent survey, nearly one-half of the public favored parole
or pardon. See Field, Public Divided on Freeing Patty, San Francisco Chronicle, Sept.
15, 1978, at 1, col. 1; Pleas for Patty: Support Grows for Her Release, TrME, Oct. 2,
1978, at 34 (40,000 persons signed pleas for clemency).
Subsequent to the appearance of the poll the Harrises pleaded guilty to the kid-
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Consider a hypothetical individual captured by an outlaw gang
and subjected to lengthy thought reform techniques, beginning with
threats and terror, and continuing with isolation, starvation, sleep
deprivation, and guilt manipulation carried out by seemingly all-
powerful captors. At various intervals in the process, that individual's
captors demand that he perform criminal acts for their benefit. Under
traditional criminal defense theories, exculpation would be available
for those crimes the victim commits during the initial stages of cap-
tivity, when classic duress and coercion exist,32 but not during the
latter stages, when such overt coercion no longer is necessary for the
captors to maintain control." Such a result is surely wrong. The
breakdown of the victim's identity and will in the latter stages of the
coercive persuasion process destroys the very mechanisms by which
he might have offered resistance. Thus, acquiescence is rendered
more certain than in the early stages when simple duress is applied.3'
A person under direct threats of death will rarely cling to even deeply
held beliefs. 5 Rarer still is the individual who can resist protracted,
unremitting, coercive thought reform techniques. 6
Consideration of theories traditionally believed to justify punish-
ment also suggests that coercive persuasion should be taken into
account in assessing a defendant's criminal guilt. Prison law deci-
sions hold that punishment, to be constitutional, must advance one
or more of the accepted rationales of the criminal justice system-
societal safety, rehabilitation, deterrence, or retribution. 3 Punitive
treatment of coercively persuaded defendants is difficult to reconcile
napping, thereby implying that Miss Hearst was blameless for the manner in which
she became involved in the group. Miss Hearst's counsel feels that many persons who
expressed the belief that she should receive punishment did so on the grounds that she
was somehow involved in her own kidnapping. These individuals may well soften their
attitude toward Miss Hearst. Telephone Interview with George C. Martinez, Attorney,
in San Francisco (Oct. 5, 1978).
32. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scowr, supra note 20, § 49, at 377-81.
33. In these latter stages, a defense of coercion would not lie because there is no
immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, and often the victim does not avail
himself of the opportunity to escape when it arises. Id. at 378-79 & n.40.
34. See note 16 supra.
35. Those who do so are customarily thought of as martyrs. See, e.g., PLATO, THE
APOLOGY (J. Kaplan ed. 1950) (Socrates accepts death sentence rather than exile for
"corrupting the youth" of Athens).
36. See note 16 supra and sources cited therein. See also E. ScHEIN, supra note
3, at 163-66 (examples of Western victims of Chinese thought reform who subsequently
praised their captors, expressing thanks for their own brainwashing); id. at 54-56
(ability of such thought reform methods to remake individuals into "new men").
37. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-24 (1974) (prisoners' access to
press); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-16 (1974) (censorship of prison mail);
Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp.
1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See generally Delgado, supra note 23, at 239-41 (1977).
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with this requirement. Past experience demonstrates that most such
victims, once removed from the coercive environment, soon lose
their inculcated responses and return to their former modes of think-
ing and acting.38 This return often is accompanied by expressions of
anger, in which the former captive accuses his captors of the "rape"
of his mind and personality. 9 Punishment of such individuals does
little to promote the rationales of the criminal justice system.40
38. See R. LIFTON, supra note 1, at 86-151; HEARST, supra note 4, at 258-62
(testimony of Louis J. West); id. at 318-21 (testimony of Robert J. Lifton); Rensberger,
supra note 7. These persons may not, however, return to the same "place"; the post-
thought reform personality may contain elements of both the old and the imposed self.
Lifton Interview, supra note 26. Nevertheless, these persons generally will be law-
abiding. After her capture and opportunity to converse with friends and family, Patri-
cia Hearst slowly began to lose her revolutionary identity. Although not the same
young, naive woman who had been engaged to marry Steve Weed, she was recognizably
Patty once again. But cf. Lunde & Wilson, supra note 22, at 352 n.45 ("It is arguable
that Patricia Hearst's experience in the San Mateo County Jail during the months
following her arrest constituted a period of 'deprogramming' at the hands of the de-
fense team."). Similar observations have been made with regard to returning POWs
and victims of Chinese thought reform universities. See, e.g., R. LirroN, supra note 1,
at 86-152.
39. See, e.g., R. LwroN, supra note 1, at 133-51; HEARST, supra note 4, at 318.
See also Delgado, supra note 5, at 80 n.405.
40. The rationale of rehabilitation is inapplicable, because these persons do not
need to be "reformed" for a second time by the criminal justice system to be law-
abiding. See note 38 supra. See generally K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT
(1968); B. WoOTrON, CRIME AND THE CmMNAL LAW 32-57 (1963). For similar reasons,
the interest in societal protection is not advanced, since after the programmed-in
responses wash away, the victim is no more likely to commit violent crime than the
average person. See H. PACKER, THE LIrrS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 48-53 (1968);
cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965) (bill of attainder invalid for pre-
ventive purposes). Hence, specific deterrence-the notion that the offender needs to
be discouraged from repeating his act-is inapplicable. General deterrence, however,
might be considered to support punishment for such individuals, in order to discourage
others from engaging in similar conduct. See generally Adenaes, The General Preven-
tive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949 (1966). This rationale depends,
however, on moral condemnation of the defendant, since otherwise it could as easily
justify punishing, on utilitarian grounds, randomly chosen innocent persons. To avoid
such results, proponents of general deterrence add the limitation that the person cho-
sen for punishment be selected from among the guilty. See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra at
62-70. If, as seems likely, the informed public views the "brainwashing" victim as
morally blameless, there is no purpose in punishing such victims to enforce respect for,
or fear of, the law. Punishment in such cases could, in fact, weaken the utilitarian basis
of deterrence, since one may "as good be hanged for a sheep as a lamb."
A final rationale for punishment is retribution-the notion that wrongdoers must
suffer because justice demands it, see, e.g., I. KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie
trans. 1974) ("Punishment. . . must in all cases be imposed only because the indi'd-
ual . . . has committed a Crime.") (emphasis omitted), or because it is a necessary
occasion for the criminal to repent and recognize his errois. See generally F. DosToEv-
SKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 532 (C. Garnett trans. 1951); Plato, The Gorgias, in THE
COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 262-63 (E. Hamilton & H. Cairns eds. 1961). Like
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If punishment of the coercively persuaded defendant conflicts
with both basic intuitions and the justifications advanced for invoca-
tion of criminal punishment, yet cannot be avoided under any exist-
ing defense theory, it becomes necessary to fashion a new theory of
defense. Occam's razor' dictates that any such new defense should
constitute, insofar as is possible, a logical extension of existing con-
cepts of act, intent, and blame." The actus reus of defendants who
have undergone coercive persuasion is undisputed,43 they apparently
are neither insane, coerced, nor acting under diminished capacity,4
and yet they seem less than fully responsible for their acts. This is so
because the coercively persuaded defendant's choice to act criminally
was not freely made and, indeed, appears to be not his choice at all."
Traditional mens rea analysis has inquired only whether a defendant
who committed an allegedly criminal act possessed the requisite state
of criminal mind at the time of the act. In the case of the coercively
persuaded defendant, it is appropriate to ask also whether the intent
the actor possessed can properly be said to be his own."
general deterrence, however, moral condemnation of the offender is a prerequisite for
retribution. See e.g., E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVIsION OF LABOR IN SocIErY 108-09 (G. Simp-
son trans. 1933). An important ingredient in such moral condemnation is a belief that
the offender had the possibility of controlling his conduct-the ability to understand
the rules, to deliberate without undue impairment of his capacities, and to reach
decisions concerning his choice of conduct. See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT
AND REsPoNsmmmrr 227-30 (1968). If one accepts the view that the coercively persuaded
victim lacks these capacities, the moral basis for retributive punishment vanishes.
Unlike alcoholism or drug addiction, there is not even an original moral fault, since
the entire process is induced by another with no initiative on the part of the victim.
Cf. People v. Zapata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 903, 911-13, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171, 177-78 (1963)
(denial of addict's request for rehabilitation not reversible error); People v. Nettles,
34 Ill. 2d 52, 56, 213 N.E.2d 536, 539 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1008 (1967) (addict's
prosecution for possession of narcotics not unconstitutional punishment for status).
41. Attributed to William of Occam, the principle-that entities should not be
multiplied beyond necessity-urges that the simplest possible rule or theory be
adopted that is consistent with the facts or phenomena to be explained. See, e.g., B.
RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PmLosopHY 472 (Essandess paperback ed. 1945).
42. See note 29 supra (placing coercive persuasion defense in extant category
avoids stretching lines of existing defenses, such as insanity or duress); note 67 infra
(defense fills in a pre-existing void, or asymmetry, in the theory of criminal excuses).
43. Unlike cases of hypnotism, see text accompanying notes 59-63 infra, the acts
of the coercively persuaded defendant lack the reflexive, unpremeditated, automatic
quality that is required for an actus reus defense. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 222-28 (2d ed. 1960) (actus reus defenses); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
44. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
45. The criminal justice system requires, as a general matter, that before punish-
ment is imposed, it must be shown that the defendant freely chose to act as he did.
See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See also H.
PACKER, supra note 40, at 103-35.
46. See note 39 supra and accompanying text; note 40 supra.
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The victim of thought reform typically commits criminal acts
fully aware of their wrongfulness." He acts consciously, even enthu-
siastically, 8 and without overt coercion. Yet, in an important sense,
the guilty mind with which he acts is not his own. Rather, his mental
state is more appropriately ascribed to the captors who instilled it in
him for their own purposes. Explication of the concept of transferred
or superimposed mens rea-criminal intent that is not the actor's
own-is thus the principal task of this Article. Initially, an example
is presented in which characterization of a person's actions as stem-
ming from an intent other than his own seems intuitively plausible.
Then, various existing legal doctrines are reviewed in order to ascer-
tain the extent to which analogous concepts of transferred or super-
imposed mental states have been applied to relieve the actor of liabil-
ity in other contexts. Concluding that the notion of implanted mens
rea offers, both intuitively and doctrinally, a tenable basis for a new
criminal defense, a third section offers criteria for determining when
such a transfer has occurred. A final section considers possible objec-
tions to the new defense, including the criticisms that the defense
would have no clearly defined boundaries and that it would destroy
the concept of free will that underlies the criminal justice system.
H. A CASE IN WHICH THE DEFENSE SEEMS
INTUITIVELY PLAUSIBLE
Lightweight, implantable "stimoceivers" are available for treat-
ment of a variety of neurological and psychiatric disorders, including
mood disturbances, movement disorders, disturbances of conscious-
ness, intractable pain, and impulsive violence and irascibility.49
When employed for any of these uses, the stimoceiver functions much
like a cardiac pacemaker, prompting some neuroscientists to refer to
it as a "pacemaker for the brain." Able to send and receive radio
47. See, e.g., W. SARGANT, supra note 5, at 189-92 (prisoners knowingly confess
to acts not done); cf. E. HuNTER, BRAINWASHING 238-41 (POWs "learn" to confess,
implying that they recognize wrongfulness); R. LiFroN, supra note 1, at 67-83 (person
undergoes "rebirth," emerges as a new, seemingly autonomous individual); id. at 84
(person identifies with captors, is "happy in his faith").
48. See, e.g., R. LIFrON, supra note 1, at 84; E. SCHEIN, supra note 3, at 157-58
(range of possible responses inevitably includes this occurrence). See generally HEARST,
supra note 4.
49. See J. DELGADO, PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE MIND 142-43, 181, 200-01 (1969);
Delgado, Mark, Sweet, Ervin, Weiss, Bach-Y-Rita & Hagiwara, Intracerebral Radio
Stimulation and Recording in Completely Free Subjects, 147 J. NERVous & MENTAL
DISORDER 329 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Intracerebral Stimulation]. See generally
Delgado, supra note 23, at 223-27.
50. See Heath, Modulation of Emotion with a Brain Pacemaker, 165 J. NERvous
& MENTAL DISORDER 300 (1977).
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and electrical signals simultaneously, the device is cemented to the
patient's skull and connected to thin electrodes surgically implanted
in areas of the brain suspected of giving rise to the aberrant behav-
ior.5' If the stimoceiver detects abnormal electrical activity, the area
is stimulated by weak electrical currents transmitted through the
apparatus.2 If this stimulation produces the desired behavior, the
area may be treated chemically or surgically.53 Since a stimoceiver
works by radio transmission, remote monitoring is possible."
Suppose that a stimoceiver-equipped patient, outside the labora-
tory, and at a time when he believes the device to be inoperative,
receives through it a signal-a stray impulse, or one sent by a practi-
cal joker, enemy, or madman-that activates portions of his limbic
brain, 5  causing him to feel inexplicably and overwhelmingly angry.
Unable to attribute his anger to the electrical stimulus, the patient
might discharge the aggressive impulse by attacking a hapless by-
stander.58 In a prosecution for assault, it would be difficult to excul-
pate such an individual under an existing defense, such as uncon-
sciousness, coercion, insanity, or diminished capacity." Yet common
sense indicates that there is no purpose in punishing the defendant.
The attack was instigated by the radio signal, which was transmitted
without any fault on the part of the recipient. No one could reason-
ably be expected to resist the powerful mood change that resulted."
If the defendant possessed mens rea at all, it seems more natural to
attribute it not to the patient but to the sender, since it is his will
and intent that is expressed through the patient's criminal act.
51. See authorities cited in notes 49-50 supra.
52. See Intracerebral Stimulation, supra note 49, at 336-38. See generally Del-
gado, supra note 23, at 227.
53. See Delgado, supra note 23, at 227, 232-38.
54. See authorities cited in note 49 supra; V. MARK & F. EavIN, VIOLENCE & THE
BRAIN 97-108 (1978); Delgado, supra note 23, at 224-25.
55. Located deep within the lower, more primitive area of the brain, the limbic
system governs functions of the brain stem, including arousal and fight-or-flight be-
havior. Organic treatments for violent behavior have often focused on the limbic sys-
tem. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 23, at 223-27, 232-38, and sources cited therein.
56. This hypothetical example may be compared with the description of the
behavior of a patient under limbic brain stimulation. See, e.g., V. MARK & F. ERVIN,
supra note 54, at 97-108.
57. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. Since the patient's response is
mediated by a mood change involving the higher brain centers, rather than being
triggered by reflex action, a defense of automatism would not lie. Such a patient's
action is fundamentally different from that of a patient suffering an epileptic seizure
or sleepwalking in that it is conscious and involves some elements of choice. See notes
155-58 infra and accompanying text (Brainwashed victims often have a mix of im-
planted "intentions"-impulses to commit specific criminal acts-and "motivations"
-more generalized value orientations.).
58. For example, see the description of the patient's reaction in J. DELGADO,
supra note 49, at 114 ("1 guess, Doctor, that your electricity is stronger than my will.").
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III. ANALOGOUS CONCEPTS INVOLVING INDUCED
MENTAL STATES
In a number of contexts, courts have expressed a willingness to
relieve individuals from responsibility for criminal acts based on
transferred intent or design.
One illustration of the concept of transferred mens rea is found
in cases of posthypnotic suggestion." California recognizes a de-
fense of hypnosis," and the Model Penal Code incorporates a hyp-
nosis defense under its treatment of actus reus," justifying it by the
marked dependency and helplessness of the subject.2 It would
seem that the hypnosis defense might more appropriately be ana-
lyzed according to the transferred mens rea concept. Regardless
of its theoretical moorings, however, the doctrine assigns criminal
responsibility to the hypnotist who procures the illegal behavior, not
to the subject who physically carries it out. 3 This approach recog-
nizes that the hypnotized subject is more a victim of the crime than
its perpetrator, and that a search beyond the primary actor will reveal
another to whom the criminal action may more appropriately be
ascribed.
The Model Penal Code also refuses to inculpate when an other-
wise criminal act results from reflex, convulsion, unconsciousness, or
an active state of automatism, because of the involuntary nature of
the act committed.6 ' The victim of brainwashing, by contrast, acts
voluntarily and is usually aware of the wrongfulness of his acts. 5
Thus, such cases do not fit squarely into the Code's treatment of
hypnosis-transferred actus reus. Yet the recognition that there can
59. Some psychologists believe that there is an element of hypnotic suggestion
in coercive persuasion. See, e.g., Farber, Harlow & West, supra note 7. Those authors
observe that the hypnotized subject, like the thought reform victim, responds automat-
ically, especially to verbal stimuli, is greatly influenced by the attitude of the leader
or hypnotist, and is highly selective in his responses. See also J. MEERLO, supra note
2, at 31-36.
60. People v. Marsh, 170 Cal. App. 2d 284, 338 P.2d 495 (1959) (trial judge's
instruction on hypnosis defense upheld).
61. See MoDnL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(C) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
62. Id. § 2.01, Comment at 122 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
63. The Code makes third parties liable for the acts of others generally through
the law of inchoate crime. See id. at §§ 2.06, 5.02. Defining hypnosis, as well as reflex,
convulsion, and unconsciousness in actus reus terms constitutes one form of recogniz-
ing that the defendant who committed the act in question was not morally culpable.
Because of the "dependence of the subject on the hypnotist," hypnosis was seen by
the drafters as requiring special comment. Id. § 2.01, Comment at 121 (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955).
64. Id.
65. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
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be transferred actus reus is an important step toward recognizing a
new defense for the coercively persuaded defendant. If a showing that
the actus reus originates outside the defendant results in exoneration,
the same consequence should follow when it is the element of mens
rea that is externally induced."8
Presumably, this extension has not previously occurred because
until recently it was considered impossible to interfere with the men-
tal states of others to the same extent as with their physical acts. The
development of potent techniques of organic and psychological be-
havior control, however, suggests that such an extension is now ap-
propriate. 7 Like the addition of newly discovered elements to the
periodic table, recognition of a defense based on transferred mens rea
66. An even clearer, although rarer, case would be one in which A physically
guided the hand of B in carrying out a criminal act. Assuming that B resisted and that
A used overwhelming force in seizing and guiding B's hand, there is little doubt that
B would be entitled to an actus reus defense. Why should not the same result follow
when A uses illegitimate and irresistible force to gain control of B's mind?
67. Advances in medicine and psychiatry have frequently required adjustments
in thinking about crime and offenders. See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d
862, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ("The science of psychiatry now recognizes that a man is an
integrated personality and that reason . . . is not the sole determinant of his con-
duct."); Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929) (speaking of the
"great advancement in medical science as an enlightening influence," court held that
uncontrollable impulse will exculpate under insanity doctrine). But see Blocker v.
United States, 288 F.2d 853, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring in result)
(rejecting the view that scientific advances must always be accompanied by legal
change). See also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 559-60 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting)
(scientific evidence regarding insanity should not be excluded merely because the
science is imprecise).
Although the case for exculpation is perhaps clearest when physical means or
hypnosis are employed, the same considerations argue for leniency when the tech-
niques used are those of classic thought reform. The mechanisms are equally well
known and studied. See notes 123-30 infra and accompanying text. While the period
of time in which they operate may be longer, they are ultimately as difficult to resist
as those that are purely physical. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text. In-
deed, some authorities believe resistance simply hastens the ultimate breakdown. See,
e.g., W. SARGmrr, supra note 5, at 48-55, 108. Recent studies of the physiology, of
coercive persuasion suggest that the underlying mechanisms may well be identical to
those involved when purely organic means are used. Address of John Clark, M.D.,
Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, at Central American Rabbinical
Conf., New Haven, Conn. (May 17, 1978) (coercive persuasion disrupts neural func-
tioning necessary to process and assimilate new information); see G.A.P. SYMPosiUM
No. 3, supra note 6 (food, sleep deprivation, isolation, exhaustion, pain); E. ScHEIN,
supra note 3, at 198-202 (physiological stress theories); Delgado, supra note 5, at 57
n.306 (neurophysiological explanation for cultist conversion indoctrination). See gener-
ally W. SAROANT, supra note 5, at 29-46 (Pavlovian conditioning theory of coercive
persuasion). Whether the disorganizing effect is achieved by sleep and dietary depriva-
tion, or by a potent drug or electrical current, is immaterial. Both forms of intervention
interfere with the physical substrata of autonomous mental functioning, with similar
effects.
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simply fills in an existing asymmetry in the theory of criminal ex-
cuses.
Another existing legal doctrine that employs the concept of
transferred mens rea is entrapment. 8 The prevailing test for entrap-
ment examines the extent to which criminal intent originates not
with the defendant but with the police authorities. 9 In the leading
case of Sorrells v. United States,7" a government agent, whose sole
purpose was to entrap the defendant, posed as a tourist and con-
vinced the defendant to sell him liquor for a friend. The Court found
that the defendant had no previous disposition to commit the crime
and was lured into doing so only by the agent's persistent solicitation
and appeals to wartime reminiscences. Observing that the govern-
ment may provide the opportunity or the facilities for the commission
of an act so as "to reveal the [preexisting] criminal design,"'" the
Court held that a different case was presented when "the criminal
design originates with . . the Government [agents], and they im-
plant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit
the alleged offense .... ,,72 In such a case, the criminal act is not
properly ascribable to the defendant, but is "the creature of"73 the
agent who procured it.
Subsequent cases have also interpreted the test for entrapment
in terms of transferred mens rea. One court, for example, stated that
"it is . . .when the Government's deception actually implants the
criminal design in the mind of the defendant that the defense of
entrapment comes into play.17
Entrapment, however, is not exclusively a transferred mens rea
defense. It also reflects a desire to curb egregious police conduct.75 For
68. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 20, § 48, at 372, 374.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). See generally Wil-
liams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28
FORDHAM L. REv. 399 (1959).
70. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
71. Id. at 441-42.
72. Id. at 442.
73. Id. at 441.
74. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973); accord, Ryles v. United
States, 183 F.2d 944, 945 (10th Cir. 1950) (entrapment will lie when "government
agents induce and originate the criminal intent of the defendant"); see State v. Nelson,
228 N.W.2d 143, 147 (S.D. 1975) (when the evidence shows "the criminal intent is
traceable to the defendant [and not] the Government Agent," an entrapment defense
will not lie).
75. A minority of the Supreme Court has consistently preferred to rest exculpa-
tion directly upon a public policy of deterring distasteful law enforcement practices.
See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 439 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sher-
man v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result);
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 459 (Robert, J., concurring) ("The applicable
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this reason, courts have permitted the entrapment defense in the face
of official behavior falling considerably short of coercive persuasion.7'
Police confession cases evidence similar judicial concern about
superimposed or transferred mental states. In Reck v. Pate," the
Supreme Court invalidated a confession given by a nineteen-year-old
youth of subnormal intelligence after four days in police custody. On
each day of his confinement, the youth had been subjected to "six-
or seven-hour stretches of relentless and incessant interrogation"78
conducted by groups of officers. Moreover, he had been intermit-
tently placed on public exhibition, interrogated until he vomited
blood, given morphine, among other drugs, and denied adequate food
and all contact with the outside world. " This combination of circum-
stances, the Court said, was "so inherently coercive that its very
existence is irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom by
a lone suspect against whom its full coercive force is brought to
bear."8 In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas recognized that
identified interrogation techniques "can give the interrogator effec-
tive command over the prisoner."8'
In Miranda v. Arizona,8" the Court dealt again with the ability
of forceful interrogation methods to deprive a suspect of free choice.
Citing practices suggested by police manuals-including guilt ma-
nipulation, isolation, pretended kindness, and physical and mental
stress-as tantamount, according to one authority, to "brain-
washing," 3 the Court struck down a custodial confession and pre-
scribed detailed rules in an effort to control police questioning tech-
niques.
In a majority of the confession cases, the issue is whether inten-
sive interrogation has deprived the victim of the ability to resist a
principle is that courts must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the govern-
ment's own agents.").
76. In Sorrells, for example, the government agent persistently implored the
defendant to commit the criminal act, but resorted to few of the classic techniques of
coercive persuasion, such as physiological depletion, guilt manipulation, and threats
of annihilation. See generally Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. Rzv.
163, 180-83 (1976); see also United States v. Costello, 483 F.2d 1366, 1368 (5th Cir.
1973) ("inducement or persuasion"); Johnson v. United States, 317 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir.
1963) (offering to provide the defendant with funds to commit the offense); United
States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1952) ("soliciting, proposing, initiating,
broaching, or suggesting" that the defendant commit a crime).
77. 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
78. Id. at 441.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 442.
81. Id. at 445.
82. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
83. Id. at 445-58.
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demand for confession." In the recent case of Reilly v. StateU how-
ever, the concern was that such interrogation produced not only a
confession, but also the suspect's subjective belief that he was, in
fact, guilty. Reilly involved the conviction of a "somewhat imma-
ture" young man with a weak sense of self,86 who underwent intensive
questioning by the authorities in connection with the death of Ms
mother. After he refused to confess, the police succeeded in convinc-
ing the suspect that since he could not remember killing her, he must
have done so.87 The confession finally obtained was later described by
a psychiatrist as the product of the young man's low self-esteem and
suggestibility resulting from induced guilt and exhaustion.8 The psy-
chiatrist compared the methods used in procuring his confession to
prisoner of war thought reform. After a defense committee of promi-
nent local residents urged that the case be reopened, a Connecticut
appellate court ordered a new trial,8 citing the questionable reliabil-
ity of the confession, as well as the state's suppression of exculpating
evidence. Charges were eventually dropped.
Cases involving multiple personalities or defendants who testify
while under the influence of psychoactive drugs further illustrate the
criminal law's insistence that any requisite mental state be found to
be that of the defendant himself. In People v. Bicknell, ° a criminal
defendant was acquitted following his testimony, given under hypno-
sis, establishing that he suffered a multiple personality. A psychia-
trist elicited the testimony of two alter egos, who placed the blame
on a third, evil personality whose existence had since been dispelled
by therapy." The defense theory apparently was that the guilty indi-
vidual simply no longer existed.
In State v. Murphy,"2 a criminal defendant won a new trial as a
result of evidence that during the earlier proceeding he had testified
while under the influence of powerful mind-altering medication. The
rationale for the court's order appears to have been that the jury had
not been exposed to the "real" defendant; as such, the conviction
84. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (lengthy interrogation and
denial of opportunity to consult with attorney); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961) (incommunicado detention accompanied by pretense of bringing accused's wife
in for questioning); Ashcroft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (36 hours of question-
ing); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (brutal beating). See also text accom-
panying notes 77-83 supra.
85. 355 A.2d 324 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976).
86. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1976, at 41, col. 3.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 355 A.2d 324, 336-37 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976).
90. No. 102329 (Mun. Ct., San Jose, Cal., June 21, 1976).
91. Id.
92. 56 Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960).
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violated his right to trial by jury."3 On similar grounds, many courts
have refused to try criminal defendants who have been committed to
mental institutions earlier because of incompetency to stand trial."4
Often, a short period of hospitalization coupled with treatment by
antipsychotic drugs will have restored the individual to apparent
normality. Despite such changes, however, courts have refused to try
such defendants on the ground that their competency is only a type
of "chemical sanity," even though their condition is identical to that
prior to the onset of the illness.
5
As a final area of comparison it is useful to examine the way in
which the law deals with impermissible influences upon an actor's
formulation of intent in civil cases. This branch of the law takes an
even less restrictive view of the circumstances that will relieve the
actor of liability. In contract law, for example, duress is defined as
any wrongful threat that induces an individual to enter into an agree-
ment while unable to exercise free will and judgment."5 Similarly, a
testamentary arrangement will be set aside if the testator was in-
duced to make it under circumstances such that it "appear[s] in
outward form to be his . . . although in reality [it] . . . embodies
the wishes and dispositive plan of another person and is not the will
of the testator at all.""7 Such a document, "[a]lthough executed by
the testator . . . is the product of a captive mind."98 In these cases,
"[t]he will of another person is substituted for and disguised as the
will of the testator";" the testator's act becomes "in effect, that of
another."'H
In civil cases, then, courts utilize notions of substituted will or
intent to relieve parties of responsibility when it appears that exter-
nal forces have influenced them to enter into relationships that would
otherwise be binding. Of course, this need not mean that similar fact
patterns should enable a criminal defendant to escape liability. The
criminal and civil law respond to different interests.'"' Nevertheless,
93. Id. at 767-68, 355 P.2d at 327.
94. See Winick, Psychotropic Medications and Competence to Stand Trial, 3
AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 769, 772 (1977), and cases cited therein.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Kaplan, 26 Ill. 2d 181, 185, 182 N.E.2d 706, 709 (1962);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 317, 319 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977). See
generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CoNTRACTS 262-63 (2d ed. 1977).
97. 1 W. PAGE, THE LAW OF WELLS § 15.3, at 718 (1960).
98. Id. at 719.
99. Id. at 718; In re Estate of Mott, 200 Iowa Rep. 948, 948, 205 N.W. 770, 770
(1925).
100. 1 W. PAGE, supra note 97, § 15.2, at 712.
101. In contract law, for example, the parties may agree to rescind the contract
and waive damages, whereas the victim's forgiveness cannot affect the liability of one
who commits a criminal act. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 20, § 57, at 410-
11.
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these civil analogues, together with the criminal examples discussed
earlier, demonstrate that the concept of transferred or imposed intent
has proved not only intelligible and useful but also indispensible to
society's sense of fairness and justice.
IV. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHEN A TRANSFER OF
MENS REA HAS OCCURRED
Since traditional actus reus and mens rea defenses have been
declared inapplicable1 2 and courts have been reluctant to extend
existing defenses to thought reform victims,103 development of a new
defense along lines suggested here may well constitute the minimal
departure from existing theory that Occam's principle demands.' °0
Establishing a model for exculpation requires determining when
the application of a transferred mens rea defense is appropriate. It is
proposed that the following elements must be shown to exist:
(1) that coercive persuasion actually occurred;
(2) that the defendant's unlawful action was the proximate
result of that coercive persuasion; and
(3) that exculpation for the act committed is morally justified.
More difficult is the task of showing when these elements exist.
Criteria for determining the class of individuals entitled to a trans-
ferred mens rea should enable one to "draw the line"-to distinguish
cases that warrant exculpation from those that do not because the
accused has simply given in to temptation, learned to commit crimes,
or voluntarily adopted the behavior patterns of a criminal subcul-
ture.' 5 Although transferred ownership of mens rea, like other
"polysynthetic"'" legal concepts, is difficult to reduce to a precise set
of necessary and sufficient conditions, there are factors which, in
combination, warrant its application. These include:
a. The defendant's mental state results from unusual or
abnormal influences, including drugs, hypnosis, prolonged con-
finement, physiological depletion, and deliberate manipulation
102. See, e.g., Lunde & Wilson, supra note 22, at 377-82; Note, supra note 22,
at 478-79.
103. See note 17 supra; HEARST, supra note 4; cf. V. Buouosi & C. GEN~my, supra
note 4 (insanity defense rejected in Charles Manson murder trial).
104. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
105. Compare United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, J., concurring), with Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL.
L. REv. 385, 389 (1976).
106. Cf. Shapiro, Therapeutic Justifications for Intervention into Mentation and
Behavior, 13 DuQ. L. Rav. 673, 730-31 (1975) (arguing that autonomy-brainwashing's
opposite-is a polysynthetic concept, i.e., one that is incapable of being reduced to a
determinate set of conditions or properties).
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of guilt, terror, and anxiety.107 These are not the mechanisms of
ordinary attitudinal change, and a finding that they were instru-
mental in bringing about the criminal act suggests that the
mens rea with which the victim acted was not his own.
b. The induced mental state represents a sharp departure
from the individual's ordinary mode of thinking."'5 The more
gradual the change, the more likely it is to be found to be the
product of education, maturation, or other ordinary processes
which do not call for exculpation. In some instances, the
changes induced may be so geat as to suggest that the individ-
ual has undergone a change of identity. 9 A defense based on
ownership and ascription of mens rea does not require that a
defendant be so transformed, however. Rather, exculpation
from criminal liability is appropriate whenever a defendant's
state of mind with reference to a particular criminal act is found
to be implanted, inauthentic, and not of his own choosing.
c. The state is one that is imposed on the subject, rather
than self-induced or consciously selected."' Most victims of
coercive persuasion, like Cardinal Mindszenty or the American
107. See HOUSE COMM. ON UN-AmERicAN ACTIVITIES, 85TH CONG., 2D SESs., COM-
MUNIST PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (BRAINwASHING) 21 (Comm. Print 1958) (consultation
with Edward Hunter); R. LInroN, supra note 1, at 21-85; E. SCHEIN, supra note 3, at
195-268; HEARST, supra note 4, at 154-56; Bettelheim, supra note 13, at 417; notes 6-7
supra; note 13 supra and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Vermont Hearing, supra note 18, at 17; Vermont Legislative Coun-
cil, Hearings Before the Vermont Senate Judiciary Comm. 43 (Mar. 10, 1976) (radical
personality alterations resulting from cultist conditioning); Lifton, Psychiatric Aspects
of Chinese Communist Thought Reform, in GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIA-
TRY, Symposium No. 4: METHODS OF FORCEFUL INDOCTRINATION 238,247-48 (1957) (ident-
ity change in Chinese thought reform programs). See generally R. LiFTON, supra note
1, at 5, 11, 66, 83; HEARST, supra note 4, at 97. See also note 109 infra and accompany-
ing text (identity change).
109. Examples of this phenomenon are the frozen-faced cardinal who, after
weeks of relentless questioning, confessed elaborate crimes against the state to his
Communist captors, see J. CARDINAL MINDSZENTY, MEMOIRS 110-14 (1974), psychosur-
gery patients who return home as strangers to their spouses, see, e.g., Delgado, supra
note 23, at 236-37, and the monotonous-voiced Tanya whose taped messages rejected
society, her parents, and her former values, see Hearst Defense Fails to Suppress
Adverse Evidence, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1976, at 1, col. 5 (Tanya tapes). These severe
changes may also be noted in victims of mass disasters, see, e.g., R. LIFTON, DEATH IN
LIFE: SURVIVORS OF HIROSHIMA (1968), and those who have suffered extreme physical
and psychological traumas, see, e.g., Comment, The Limits of State Intervention:
Personal Identity and Ultra-Risky Actions, 85 YALE L.J. 826, 837 n.51 (1976), and
sources cited therein.
Psychologists have explained these changes in terms of psycho-physiological stress
theory, dissociation, and dissonance, see HEARST, supra note 4, at 298-99 (testimony
of Martin T. Orne); E. SCHEIN, supra note 3, at 198-205, 241-43, while neurophysiol-
ogists have focused on the effect of chemical-endocrine changes on the brain. See J.
DELGADO, supra note 49, at 214.
110. This change can result from coercion, as in the POW cases cited at note 17
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prisoners of war, will be found to have resisted the process, at
least initially."' In other cases, for example those involving reli-
gious cults, the voluntary quality of the joining process may be
placed in question by the employment of deception in luring
potential converts to initial meetings, after which thought re-
form techniques are brought to bear."' Resistance or deception
suggest that the resulting condition of psychological servitude
was not freely chosen by the victim. The Manson women, by
contrast, appeared to have elected to voluntarily become mem-
bers of the group, and to undergo a lengthy process of initiation
and indoctrination without protest."' In such a case, a legal
defense based on transferred mens rea should not be available.
By analogy to voluntary intoxication, the victim can be blamed
for his own condition."' If his mental processes have been al-
tered in such a way as to make it more likely that he will commit
crimes, his initial choice to undergo such changes was made
with a free will. This choice is itself blameworthy," 5 rendering
the actor an appropriate object of punishment.
d. The criminal acts benefit the captors."' Since ordinary
human motivation is self-seeking, a showing that an individual
engaged in behavior that could only benefit another suggests the
presence of abnormal influence. This is particularly true when
the actions induced are dangerous and are ones the individual
showed no interest in performing before falling under the control
of the captors.
e. The actor, when apprised of the manner in which he
came to hold his beliefs, rejects them and sees them as inauth-
entic or foreign.' If, after having been acquainted with the
supra, or the Patricia Hearst case, see note 19 supra and accompanying text, or from
deception, as is often the case in cultist thought reform, see note 18 supra and accom-
panying text.
111. See, e.g., authorities cited in note 126 infra (prisoners of war); J. CARDINAL
MrNDSzENTY, supra note 109, at 92-114 (1974) (Catholic cardinal subjected to thought
reform by Communists).
112. Delgado, supra note 5, at 38-41, 52-53.
113. V. BuGLIosI & C. GENTRY, supra note 4, at 173-75, 234-38, 258, 278, 484.
114. See J. HALL, supra note 43, at 537.
115. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 20, § 45 at 347-48 (voluntary intoxi-
cation is no excuse).
116. In POW cases, the captors ordinarily attempted to induce the captives to
make false confessions, reveal military secrets, and carry out other acts that would
benefit them. In the Hearst case, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) procured the
victim's collaboration in a variety of criminal ventures, as well as the preparation of
propaganda tapes.
117. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text. See also Delgado, supra note
5, at 59-60, 82 n.427.
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details of his own treatment by the captors, including their mo-
tivation in subjecting him to it, he rejects his affiliation with
them (and does so genuinely, and not simply to escape punish-
ment),"' it seems reasonable to conclude that the mental state
was not his own, but was wrongfully implanted or superim-
posed."9
f. The actor evidences symptoms typical of the coercively
persuaded personality,2 0 including flattened affect, reduced
cognitive flexibility, drastic alteration of values, and extreme
dissociation.
Where all or many of these factors are present, a defense should
lie; where few are present, it may properly be denied. Even with these
criteria, some cases will be difficult. Nevertheless, as in cases involv-
ing duress, insanity, or diminished capacity, final judgment should
be entrusted to the collective moral sense of the jury. In coercive
persuasion, a number of symptoms and causes must be weighed. Just
as no clear line separates those who are sane from those who are not,
so here the jury must decide where on a continuum of responsibility
a particular defendant lies. But this is scarcely a new problem. Innu-
merable situations require that the jury members evaluate the evi-
dence before them and apply a general standard to the case at hand.
V. OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED DEFENSE
A first set of objections to a transferred mens rea defense, based
on psychiatric authority or fear of its abuse, may reflect a number of
related concerns. One is that coercive persuasion simply does not
occur, or, if it does, that psychiatrists and psychologists know too
little about it to warrant their testimony in court as expert wit-
nesses. 2' A variant of this objection is that all forms of influence are
essentially the same, "brainwashing" being simply a pejorative label
for types of influence of which we disapprove. 2 '
That the process does occur is attested to by voluminous ac-
118. The genuineness of this rejection might, of course, present difficult ques-
tions of fact, especially if it appeared to result from intensive "preparations" by teams
of defense attorneys and experts. See note 38 supra.
119. Cf. Delgado, supra note 5, at 59 & n.311 ("individual's perception of himself
as unharmed may itself appear 'programmed in' ") (citing Dworkin, Autonomy &
Behavior Control, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1976, at 23, 25-27).
120. HEARST, supra note 4, at 298; Delgado, supra note 5, at 17-18, 70-71; Shap-
iro, Destructive Cultism, 15 AM. FAM. PIYSICIAN 80, 83 (1977).
121. See, e.g., Reich, Brainwashing, Psychiatry and the Law, 39 PSYCH. 400
(1976); Szasz, Patty Hearst's Conversion: Some Call it Brainwashing, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, March 6, 1976, at 10-12.
122. See, e.g., Robbins & Anthony, The 'Brainwashing' Metaphor as Social
Weapon (Oct. 27, 1977) (paper presented at Society for the Scientific Study of lReli-
gion annual meeting, Chicago, Ill.); Szasz, supra note 121, at 10. But see Meerlo, The
Psychology of Treason & Loyalty, 8 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 648, 650 (1954).
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counts of those who have experienced it,In as well as reports of scien-
tific investigators who have studied it.1"4 The body of professional
literature related to thought reform is extensive.2I The legal system
has gained familiarity with the phenomenon through POW court-
martial cases, 21 the Hearst 1  and Manson 28 trials, and conservator-
ship "'9 and defense-of-necessity'3 cases involving religious cultists.
Against such an array of documentation, it is surely difficult to main-
tain that thought reform simply does not exist.
Similar objections have also been raised by persons belonging to
the "anti-psychiatry" school. Their criticism has an initial appeal
because many feel that psychiatry has already gone too far in influ-
encing the criminal process. 13' Moreover, this objection is in accord
with an intuitive feeling that individuals ought to be held accounta-
ble for their acts. The law, however, has long recognized a great many
defenses that free the individual of accountability for his acts.3 2 Psy-
chiatry has proven of incontrovertible value to courts in such cases. 3
123. See, e.g., Vermont Hearing, supra note 18, at 17-46 (testimony of John
Clark, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, based on study of
college youths involved in cults); HEARST, supra note 4, at 58-166 (testimony of Patricia
Hearst); R. LirroN, supra note 1 (study of coercive persuasion based on interviews with
victims of Chinese thought reform); J. CARDINAL MINDsZENTY, supra note 109.
124. See, e.g., authorities cited in notes 1-11 & 15-16 supra.
125. A partial bibliography compiled by this author contains over one hundred
articles and thirty books including symposia prepared by the authoritative Group for
the Advancement of Psychiatry (bibliography on file with the author).
126. See cases cited in note 17 supra; Note, Misconduct in the Prison Camp: A
Survey of the Law and an Analysis of the Korean Cases, 57 COLUm. L. REV. 709 (1956);
Note, Coercion: A Defense to Misconduct while a POW, 29 IND. L.J. 603 (1953).
127. United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 873 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (trial transcript
reprinted in HEARST, supra note 4).
128. People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976), cert.
denied sub nom. Manson v. California, 430 U.S. 986 (1977) (penalty trial) (reported
in V. BUGIuOSI & C. GENTRY, supra note 4).
129. See, e.g., In re Surber, No. G-946 (Super. Ct., Pima Cty., Ariz., Oct. 24,
1975); In re Petri, No. NCP 5267B (Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., Cal., Mar. 1, 1976);
In re Coleman, No. 16386 (Super. Ct., Mendocino Cty., Cal., Dec. 3, 1975). See gener-
ally Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977) (conserva-
torship for purposes of deprogramming under then existing California statute unconsti-
tutional).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Patrick, 532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1976); People v.
Patrick, N-320-778 (N.Y. Crim. Ct., Mar. 30, 1973). In these two cases the defense of
necessity was successfully asserted in prosecutions of deprogrammer Ted Patrick.
131. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flip-
ping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 692 (1974); authorities cited in note
121 supra.
132. See generally notes 59-101 supra and accompanying text.
133. In the criminal law, psychiatric testimony is best known because of its use
in insanity and diminished capacity defenses, although it is also commonly used to
tailor sentences to fit an individual defendant. Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Crimi-
nal Cases for Purposes Other than the Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. Rxv. 1051
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Certainly, psychiatric knowledge of coercive persuasion need not
be complete for it to be of use to courts. Such a requirement is not
realistic; moreover, it was not observed in connection with the devel-
opment of other mental defenses, which were recognized long before
a universally accepted scientific model was available. 13 The modern
"right from wrong" test of insanity, usually attributed to the 1843
trial of Daniel M'Naghten,I3 was intended by the judges who formu-
lated it to be but a restatement of prior law dating as early as 1724. 13
Yet, as recently as 1880 a treatise on the medical jurisprudence of
insanity offered a classificatory scheme in which insanity was consid-
ered caused by "moral influences," "intellectual overwork," and
"masturbation." '37 That the legal system chose to exculpate defen-
dants although the scientific basis for so doing was so rudimentary
suggests that scientific certainty has never been essential to the es-
tablishment of a legal defense. Instead, the law has accommodated
excusing conditions when paradigmatic cases were recognizable and
moral intuitions demanded exculpation, despite the absence of a fully
developed theory or model capable of explaining the difficult, con-
fused, or borderline case.
A final variant of this argument against recognition of a coercive
persuasion defense can be labeled the "psychoanalytical" objection.
According to this view, even intense thought reform cannot convert
a law-abiding citizen into an outlaw. Instead, for thought reform to
occur, the victim must have possessed the "germ" or "seed" of the
criminal personality; the coercive process only elicits and nourishes
what already exists in latent form.3 8 The unstated conclusion is that
(1976). It has also been used in civil cases involving contracts and wills to show whether
a party is incompetent or has been subjected to undue influence. See, e.g., In re
Kaufman's Will, 20 A.D.2d 464, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1964), aff'd mem., 15 N.Y.2d 827,
205 N.E.2d 864, 257 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1965), noted in Shaffer, Undue Influence, Confiden-
tial Relationship, and the Psychology of Transference, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 197, 218-
22 (1970). Against such a background of widespread acceptance, it seems only reasona-
ble to make available to the court the body of psychiatric knowledge concerning coer-
cive processes. Accord, Lifton, On the Hearst Trial, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1976, at 27,
col. 1; see 30 VAND. L. Rxv. 214, 218-20 (1977) (citing trend on part of courts to
recognize that advances in psychiatric knowledge make it reasonable to allow a wider
range of psychiatric testimony in connection with mental defenses). See also cases
cited in note 67 supra. In any event, the jury will hear testimony offered by both lay
witnesses and the defendant concerning his coercive experience. The jury should also
have the benefit of the evaluation of trained observers. Authoritative testimony that
can be of aid to the courts should not be denied admissibility.
134. See generally J. BIGGs, THE GUILTY MIND 79-117 (1955).
135. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). For a
discussion of the M'Naghten case and its impact, see J. BIGGS, supra note 134, at 95-
110.
136. J. HAIL, supra note 43, at 472.
137. J. BROWNE, THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 131 (1880).
138. See HEARST, supra note 4, at 520-23 (testimony of Harry L. Kozol) ("This
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the victim should be punished for containing the "seed" of his future
crime even though he once was, and again will be, law-abiding.
There are two responses to this objection. First, those psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists who are most intimately familiar with thought
reform believe that virtually everyone can be induced to behave crim-
inally if subjected to intensive thought reform in a totally controlled
environment. 3 If this is true, the psychoanalytical objection loses its
force, since everyone would be viewed as harboring a latent form of
mens rea. This, of course, divests the concept of any meaning.
In addition, the psychoanalytical objection fails to suggest a ra-
tionale for punishing the coercively persuaded offender who has re-
turned to normality. A fundamental premise of the criminal law is
that the physical act (actus reus) and the requisite mental state
(mens rea) must "concur";' the mental state must actuate and be
proportional to the criminal act."' Thus, a finding that Patricia
Hearst, for example, prior to her capture by the SLA, was a head-
strong young woman who smoked marijuana and disobeyed her
teachers' would not sustain her conviction for armed robbery, since
the requisite degree of mens rea is lacking. Of course, a proponent of
the psychoanalytical objection could maintain that the defendant,
prior to her kidnapping, harbored the mens rea of armed robbery, but
in latent form. This view, however, is simply implausible. If the con-
cept of mens rea were made to reach so far, it would become either a
supposed characteristic invoked only against the coercively per-
suaded or a post hoc fiction inviting abuse in other contexts as well.
Another group of objections is based on the asserted impossibil-
ity of limiting the applicability of the defense. Since coercive persua-
sion does not result in physically discernible changes, such as dis-
eased tissue, and thus falls outside a "medical model," it is arguably
impossible to determine with any precision those deserving of the
defense this Article posits. With conditions falling within the medical
model, by contrast, there is such boundary demarcation: a person is
excused when found to be "sick," and not excused when he is not."'
It could be argued that no such stopping point exists with coercive
persuasion; it shades off by degrees into milder and more conven-
tional forms of influence.
The drawing-the-line argument can, however, be made with
girl [(Hearst)] was a rebel .... [S]he had gotten into a state where she was ripe
for the plucking .... She was ready for something, she was a rebel in search of a cause
.... It was as though [the SLA] were offering her a way to get rid of the terrible
turmoil that had developed in her.").
139. See authorities cited in note 16 supra.
140. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTt, supra note 20, § 34.
141. Id. at 176.
142. HEARST, supra note 4, at 520-23 (testimony of Harry L. Kozol).
143. See United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon,
J., concurring).
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equal facility from either direction.' The different forms of influence
may be viewed as lying along a continuum, with mild forms such as
television advertising and church sermons at one end, and more se-
vere forms at the other. Those who oppose the defense are prone to
emphasize the milder forms of persuasion and ignore the fact that the
continuum also contains, at the other extreme, such brutal treatment
as that inflicted on Cardinal Mindszenty-treatment most would
agree justifies exculpation.'45 This end of the continuum must not be
overlooked, and it would seem more productive to acknowledge the
existence of a continuum along which lie increasing degrees of coer-
cive persuasion, some of which obviously do not merit a defense and
some of which may, and then attempt to identify the factors that
make application of the defense appropriate.'
A related objection is that even if an analytically defensible stop-
ping point could be found, it would be impossible to tell on which side
of it a particular defendant falls. Because the syndrome is difficult
to diagnose, allowing a defense of coercive persuasion would invite
abuse by defendants falsely claiming that their deeds were the result
of brainwashing by accomplices, leaders, friends, or others.
This problem might indeed prove difficult if a court is allowed
to consider only reports of the mental state of the actor at the time
of the crime. Because the coercively persuaded defendant may have
"felt" the decision to be his own at the time, he may truthfully have
said he was acting of his own free will.'47 Indeed, he may have ap-
peared so to the casual observer. A court is not limited to these
sources of information, however. It also may examine the victim's
later testimony concerning what happened and how he presently feels
about his earlier actions.' Moreover, there will be those external
manifestations of coercive persuasion which even lay persons will
notice and which expert testimony can aid the jury to interpret.,
These symptoms, including confusion, flattened affect, stereotyped
speech, dissociation, and memory loss, are probably as difficult to
mimic successfully before a trained observer as are the symptoms of
legal insanity. The diagnosis of coercive persuasion can be confirmed
144. See Delgado, supra note 5, at 64 n.327.
145. Compare the extremely intense, prolonged and focused thought reform de-
scribed in J. CARDINAL MinDSZENTY, supra note 109, at 92-114, with that described in
sources cited in note 2 supra (POW Chinese thought reform), and note 4 supra (reli-
gious cults and the Manson group).
146. See notes 107-20 supra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 46-48 supra and accompanying text. See generally Delgado, supra
note 5, at 57 n.306, 58 nn.309-10.
148. See, e.g., HEARST, supra note 4, at 58-166 (testimony of Patricia Hearst).
149. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA HEARINGS, supra note 18, at 29-31 (unmistakable
changes noted by parents); Delgado, supra note 5, at 71 & nn.365-66.
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by use of standardized psychological tests, including personality in-
ventories, IQ tests, and other psychological assessment techniques. 5
Finally, there is extrinsic evidence of the experience undergone by the
defendant: imprisonment, isolation, sensory deprivation, interroga-
tion, physiological depletion, and terror. These mechanisms are so
different from those of ordinary attitudinal change that, even without
a medical model, a jury should be able to determine whether or not
a particular defendant has in fact been coercively persuaded.
Refusal to recognize a defense for fear of difficult line-drawing
problems is thus needless and, potentially, inhumane. Certainly, the
boundaries of the coercive persuasion continuum represent areas of
genuine moral ambiguity. In this respect, however, the coercive per-
suasion defense is no different from the insanity defense, or, indeed,
criminal responsibility itself. Fear of such problems need not prevent
us from addressing those compelling polar cases that call for compas-
sionate, informed treatment.' It is hardly a noble doctrine that sacri-
fices individuals for the sake of preserving an artificial conceptual
simplicity in the law of criminal excuses. Instead, it only duplicates
the error of early courts-martial that heard testimony about brutal
coercive persuasion but ignored it because it did not fit into existing
legal categories of insanity or duress,5 2 a mistake repudiated by later
Department of Defense decisions. s
Even should it be granted, however, that it is possible to develop
both criteria and methodology for distinguishing between defendants
for whom the coercive persuasion defense would be appropriate and
those who might attempt to abuse it, yet other objections exist. Some
would maintain the absolutist view that the defense is fundamentally
incompatible with freedom of the will and must therefore be rejected.
150. See HEARST, supra note 4, at 297 (testimony of Martin T. Orne that use of
psychological tests renders simulation virtually impossible since tests require coordi-
nated cheating on many interlocking subsections).
151. Such refusal to act violates the injunction that human beings should be
treated as ends in themselves rather than as means. A foundation of Western moral
philosophy, this principle was given its best known formulation by Immanuel Kant,
whose Metaphysics of Morals (1785) regards it as a corollary of his "categorical impera-
tive" (act in such a way that the precepts underlying one's deeds might be
made universal law). For a discussion of Kant's moral philosophy, see B. RussELL,
HisTORy OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 677-84 (University ed. 1961).
152. See the cases of Martin Jaries Monte and Dale H. Maple, discussed in
N. WEYL, TREASON 390-99 (1950); cases cited in Note, Misconduct in the Prison Camp:
A Survey of the Law and an Analysis of the Korean Cases, 56 COLUM. L. Rzv. 709, 770
(1956). See also Lunde & Wilson, supra note 22 (rejecting idea that coercive persuasion
can be assimilated in any existing criminal defense and suggesting that it be taken into
account only as an element in mitigation of sentences).
153. See note 16 supra.
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If coercive persuasion can, however, be distinguished from more
legitimate forms of influence, at least in paradigmatic cases, a
defense of coercive persuasion does not really threaten the premise
of freedom of the will. Application of the defenses is confined to cases
recognized as markedly different from the normal. So limited, it does
not purport to exculpate for the type of whole-life conditioning that
courts have rejected as incompatible with the free will premise.',
Another doctrinal objection that could be made to a defense of
transferred mens rea is that what is transferred in coercive persuasion
is not mens rea at all, but only a predisposition to act in certain
general ways' 5 -what some criminal law commentators call a
"motivation." According to these writers, the criminal law is con-
cerned only with intent; a person's motivations are irrelevant.'5 Al-
terations of the kind produced by coercive persuasion, it could be
said, therefore cannot affect criminal liability.
There are a number of responses to this argument. First, captors
in a case likely to merit a transferred mens rea defense ordinarily will
be concerned with more than instilling changes in the victim's ideol-
ogy, beliefs, and values-the emotional-cognitive foundation that
constitutes an individual's motivations. They will also usually re-
quire that the captive perform specific acts of compliance.'57 The
captive's ability to formulate an intent to perform specific acts, there-
fore, also will be overridden by the will of the captors. These dual
objectives work synergistically. The captors instill new values and
154. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (rejecting
view that since "the behavior of every individual is dictated by forces-ultimately, his
genes and lifelong environment-that are beyond his control," exculpation must follow
for every criminal defendant). See also State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965)
(discussing law's treatment of free will and determinism).
155. For this suggestion, I am indebted to James Hardisty, Professor of Law,
University of Washington.
156. J. HALL, supra note 43, at 100-02. Hall observes that, "although motivation
is carefully considered in modem criminal law systems, the preservation of the objec-
tive meaning of the principle of mens rea and of legality requires that motivation be
excluded from the definition of criminal conduct." Id. at 102. See also State v. Sikora,
44 N.J. 453, 470-71, 210 A.2d 193, 202-03 (1965) (defendant's unconscious motivations
will not be taken into account).
157. The Symbionese Liberation Army, for example, desired that Patty Hearst
make accusatory tape recordings and aid them in robbing banks, stealing cars, and
kidnapping, see HEARsT, supra note 4, at 58-166 (testimony of Patricia Hearst); the
North Korean and Chinese prison camp authorities set out to coerce their American
captives to sign confessions and peace petitions, march in parades, and reveal military
information, see, e.g., Schein, Reaction Patterns to Severe, Chronic Stress in American
Army Prisoners of War of the Chinese, 13 J. Soc. IssuEs 21, 26-27 (1957). By contrast,
Chinese mainland thought reform was aimed at causing long-lasting attitudinal
change, thereby creating "new men." See, e.g., Lifton, supra note 26, at 8.
(Vol. 63:1
COERCIVE PERSUASION
loyalties in part to assure behavioral compliance. At the same time,
they encourage the performance of particular acts as a means of
solidifying value changes.' 5 Accordingly, intent will be as centrally
involved as the more generalized "motivation." Both forms of change
facilitate each other and are inextricably linked.
Even in the relatively rare case where it appears that the captors
have sought only to change the victim's values and attitudes, leaving
him free to choose the means by which such values will be expressed,
such changes may call for exculpation. Motivation already is taken
into account by the criminal law in various ways to reduce liability.
Self-defense, for example, requires an examination into the accused's
motives;5 9 so do necessity'60 and the defense of others."6 ' Resisting an
illegal arrest requires taking account of the motivation of the resisting
party.' Even a police officer's arrest of a felon is permissible only
with proper motivation.' A finding that an individual's values and
motivations were forcibly, brutally, and wrongfully altered, with the
result that he became the type of person who, without guidance or
force, would commit crimes of certain types, should also justify exon-
eration even without a showing that specific intents or behaviors were
inculcated.
A final objection, applicable only in connection with defendants
who do not spontaneously return to normality, stems from the diffi-
culty of finding a rationale for their detention after acquittal. With
insanity and other conditions falling within the medical model, de-
fendants are detained under civil commitment provisions because of
the need to provide treatment for mental illness. But with coercive
persuasion no such rationale appears available. Acquittal and release
of such defendants may consequently appear to leave unsatisfied
society's need for retribution as well as its need to detain persons who
represent dangers to themselves or others.
158. See R. LUrON, supra note 1, at 67-70, 441; E. SCHEIN, supra note 3, at 123-
24; Schein, supra note 157, at 26 (use of minor acts of collaboration to accelerate
change).
159. See W. LAFA E & A. ScoTt, supra note 20, at 391; MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
160. See The William Gray, 29 F. Cas. 1300 (C.C.N.Y. 1810) (No. 17,694) (sale
of cargo due to necessity during an embargo); United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383) (sacrifice of passengers not excused by necessity).
161. See generally People v. Williams, 56 Ill. App. 2d 159, 165-66, 205 N.E.2d
749, 752 (1965); Morrison v. Commonwealth, 24 Ky. 2493, 2497-98, 74 S.W. 277, 279
(1903).
162. See, e.g., Hughes v. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. 497, 41 S.W. 294 (1897).
163. See, e.g., FED. R. CPum. P. 4(a) (1974) (requiring probable cause on part of
officer to believe that offense had been committed and that defendant had committed
it).
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Initially, it should be observed that such cases are likely to arise
only infrequently. Generally, the victim will have returned to normal-
ity prior to trial.' 4 Therefore, he will be in need of no further confine-
ment to effect rehabilitation or to protect the public from further
crimes. In such a case, society's retributive instinct may be ade-
quately satisfied by punishing the captors held primarily responsible
for the victim's acts.
65
In other instances, however, the coerced individual may continue
to adhere to the programmed-in values. In these cases, a range of
responses should be considered, with a view to striking a balance
between respect for the victim's autonomy and protecting the public
from harm. One obvious solution would be to exonerate the defendant
but initiate civil commitment under statutes that permit detention
of persons dangerous to themselves or others. Lack of medical or
psychological pathology, however, may render such statutes inapplic-
able. 16 6 In particular cases, therefore, a carefully drawn provision for
preventive detention might enable the state to prevent release of
acquitted defendants'67 it knows are likely to perpetrate violent
crimes because of imposed mens rea. 65 As an alternative to either
164. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text. See generally note 40
supra.
166. See Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About
Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL EDUc. 24, 32 (1970) ("The one universal criterion for involun-
tary hospitalization is the presence of mental illness.").
167. Such a dangerous defendant, however, might be entitled to release on bail
while awaiting trial. See In re Underwood, 39 Cal. 3d 345, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr.
401 (1973).
168. See Frankel, Preventive Restraints and Just Compensation: Toward a Sanc-
tion Law of the Future, 78 YALE L.J. 229, 229-31 (1968). Frankel suggests that narrowly
drawn statutes allowing preventive detention are constitutional if there is a strong
showing of their necessity, certainty, and reasonableness; they are clearly drawn; they
are not aimed at political dissidents or other enemies of the state; and they make
adequate provision for due process protections, including an adversary hearing at
which the potential detainee can challenge the grounds of his commitment.
Given the primacy of personal liberty. . . a respectable argument can
be made that preventive detention can never be justified where the person
to be detained has not consented to his detention, will not benefit from it,
and has not by prior blameworthy conduct merited detention as punishment
Nevertheless, I am forced to conclude that a complete constitutional bar
to preventive detention should not be erected. Once it becomes possible to
predict with substantial accuracy that someone constitutes a danger to the
lives of others. . ., I am not prepared to assert that he has. . . an absolute
right to freedom until he kills or tries to kill his first victim. The individuals
composing our society are entitled to protection from dangers which can be
prevented without too great a social cost.
Id. at 231 n.11. Preventive detention or deprogramming might be the only solution for
acquitted brainwashing victims where indoctrination makes them likely to behave
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form of detention, the individual could be offered psychiatric
"deconditioning" similar to that employed in connection with reli-
gious cultists"' or returning prisoners of war.1Y0
It could be objected that the state might abuse this power by
forcibly deprogramming such persons as political dissidents or civil
rights protesters, perhaps on the theory that group meetings, discus-
sion, reading, rallies, and consciousness-raising sessions constituted
a form of brainwashing.17' It seems unlikely, however, that our tradi-
tions would tolerate this. The pressures that result in imposed states
of mens rea are immediately perceived as strange and aberrant, while
those the government might cite as causes of radical or militant con-
sciousness would strike most as relatively ordinary life experiences.
Justifying official intervention because of these latter experiences
would certainly be seen as a threat to deeply held values of autonomy
and respect for individual differences. As such, it is easily distin-
guishable from the case of the coercively persuaded defendant.
Further protection against abuse is found in that before decondi-
tioning could proceed, the defendant would need to personally invoke
the defense. Many civil disobedients, if they assert a defense at all,
will likely claim not that they were brainwashed but rather that their
actions were justified by a higher law.72
Finally, several additional protections could be provided, includ-
ing:
(1) a requirement that deprogramming proceed only to the
point at which the subject is able to exercise free choice, and
that it have as its objective only the freeing of the subject from
a state of psychological domination rather than imposing a new,
or even an old, set of values or loyalties; 73
criminally but in ways that do not jeopardize the health or safety of other persons, but
commitment statues would presumably not reach such individuals if their only crimi-
nal propensity amounted to perpetuating acts of fraud, misdemeanors, etc. See
Delgado, supra note 5, at 25-35.
169. See Delgado, supra note 5, at 78-92 (discussion of religious deprogramming).
170. For discussions of treatment of returning POWs (often termed "debrief-
ing"), see authorities cited in note 2 supra.
171. Cf. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 963-64 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Baze-
Ion, J., concurring) (expressing fear that psychiatric power could be misused to de-
condition individuals who are not insane).
172. Without such a plea initiated by the defendant, counterconditioning would
likely be held to violate constitutional guarantees of due process, mentational freedom,
and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. See Shapiro, Legislating the Control
of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL.
L. Rav. 237 (1974); see, e.g., Knecht v. Gilman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); Kaimow-
itz v. Department of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne Cty., Mich.,
July 10, 1973) (reported in 2 PISON L. RpTr. 433 (1973)).
173. Cf. Delgado, supra note 5, at 86-87 (guidelines for religious deprogram-
ming).
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(2) a limitation that deprogramming be undertaken only for
those individuals who voluntarily elect to undergo it, under-
stand that alternatives, including simple confinement, are
available, but who nevertheless desire assistance in overcoming
their imposed criminal. propensities;'
(3) direct monitoring by the court or appointment of an expert
overseer charged with preventing abuse;7 5
(4) appointment of an attorney to protect the subject's rights
and help ensure that all other protective measures are observed.
If none of the above dispositional alternatives seem attractive,
and if no more satisfactory solution suggests itself, a remedy of last
resort is always available: the defense can simply be denied in cases
in which the victim has not "deconverted" prior to trial. The trials
of such persons could be delayed until it appeared they were once
again themselves, analogizing confinement to that imposed in cases
of defendants found incompetent to stand trial. Alternatively, such
defendants could be found guilty, but with a special instruction
given that penal authorities consider releasing them when it appears
that their noncriminal personalities and behavioral patterns have
reasserted themselves. Either of these latter approaches is, strictly,
inconsistent with the theoretical basis of the defense, perhaps so
much so as to invite attack on equal protection or due process
grounds. But the balance between fairness to defendants and protec-
tion of the public must be struck somewhere. In striking this balance,
it may be best to leave the dispositional problem presented by "non-
deconverted" defendants to case-by-case development in the trial
courts rather than striving for an early uniform solution applicable
in all situations.
174. It could be argued that such a choice can never be freely made. Cf. Kai-
mowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne Cty.,
Mich., July 10, 1973) (reported in 2 PISON L. Rpm. 433 (1973)) (involuntarily commit-
ted mental patients cannot consent to experimental psychosurgery). But, insofar as
the argument aims at preventing victims of coercive persuasion from making decisions
they perceive to be in their own self-interest, this paternalistic rationale for denying
them the right to make such decisions is weak. The legal system has never found it
necessary to declare plea bargaining void because of the "coerced" nature of such
bargains, nor has it found a comparable problem with respect to most ordinary condi-
tions of parole or probation. This is not to deny, of course, that courts should be
vigilant for instances of possible overbearing applications in which the state would
force deprogramming on unwilling subjects. This would constitute a flagrant abuse of
personal liberty; still, there seems to be no need to assume that the danger of abuse is
so great as to necessitate a per se rule against treatment that may be the only means
by which certain victims of brainwashing may escape confinement and return to nor-
mality.
175. Cf. Delgado, supra note 5, at 88 (guidelines for religious deprogramming).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The development and dissemination of potent techniques of
coercive thought reform/behavior control raise the spectre of such
techniques being used for illegal ends. When a group or individual
bent on criminal action succeeds in capturing and subjecting to force-
ful indoctrination a captive who would otherwise not have joined in
criminal ventures, the victim may attempt to interpose his abusive
treatment at the hands of his captors as a defense to subsequent
criminal prosecution. Since existing defense theories appear unavail-
able to such a defendant, a new defense should be considered. Such
a new defense theory may be based on considerations of the origin and
ownership of mens rea, the mental element of crime. This defense
accords with existing intuitions about the purposes and limits of
criminal punishment, and is consistent with doctrine in other areas
of the law. It is possible to provide criteria to assist the trier of fact
in determining when such a transfer has occurred. This new defense
may be applied without fatally eroding the assumption of freedom of
the will or opening the floodgates to every defendant who has been
subjected to some degree of persuasion.
Furthermore, permitting a coercive persuasion defense has a
number of advantages over existing practice. Its primary import is its
ability to articulate a rationale for excusing the conduct of those who
are not properly considered to be culpable. A new defense achieves
this without placing additional stress on already overextended exist-
ing theories such as insanity, duress, and diminished capacity. Per-
haps more significant, permitting the defense would facilitate public
exposure, through the forum of criminal trials, to the process of coer-
cive persuasion itself, thereby heightening society's awareness of the
nature and efficacy of such techniques. By attempting to determine
which coercive influences justify exculpation, a new defense would
invite close scrutiny of the myriad of psychological forces at work in
society and renew consideration of the premises underlying current
concepts of criminal responsibility.
Editor's Note:
In the next issue of the Minnesota Law Review, Professor Joshua
Dressler of the Hamline University School of Law responds to the
transferred mens rea criminal defense theory proposed by Professor
Delgado.
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